After the Anglo-American invasion, the US neo-conservative administration established the Iraqi Governing Council in July 2003, which included 25 members selected for their ethnic and religious origins; it was the most obvious sign of the US political separatist strategy. As a result of the new political reality, the Iraqi media was divided into ethnosectarian lines, resulting from previous policies followed by the US Administration.
Introduction:
This paper argues that US authorities in Iraq after 2003 assisted in politically and socially dividing the country along sectarian and ethnic lines by their interference in shaping Iraq's media and the whole political system. Some of the main sources of this paper are taken from the US government reports recently released by the National Security Archive.
Media scholars have been arguing about the importance of studying post-conflict media developments especially after the hate speech lessons learnt from former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Cambodia (Price 2000) . Assisted by different governments, international media organizations and non-governmental organizations were thought to be responsible for forming independent and professional media organizations post-conflict nations in order to assist in the overall development process. For example, the Department of Media Affairs in Kosovo was created by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in August 1999 that has the 'responsibility for media regulation, support for independent media, media monitoring, and the development of media standards' (Palmer 2001, 185) . The same plan was meant to be applied in Iraq after the 2003 invasion with the efforts of international media organizations and state interventions.
However, as will be illustrated below, the kind of foreign government intervention far exceeded the other efforts, ultimately leading to the failure of independent media projects.
After the Anglo-American occupation, the Coalition Provisional Authority decreed that the Iraqi Ministry of Information be dissolved; the decision led to the release of thousands of government workers. Another CPA media regulation followed. Order No.
14 issued on June 10 2003 under the title 'Prohibited Media Activity' stated that media organizations are not allowed to publish or broadcast material that: 'incites violence against any individual or group, including racial, ethnic or religious groups and women; incites civil disorder, rioting or damage to property; incites violence against Coalition Forces or CPA personnel'. However, this order was later applied to safeguard the CPA alone. Don North observed that US forces started to visit the headquarters of Iraqi newspapers that made offences and created great damage to the property. North even went as far as saying: 'If The Washington Post reported terrorist threats or bin Laden statements in Baghdad today, it would probably be closed down ' (2004) . Since the CPA was in charge of the country and the media sector, it became 'the judge and jury' (Reporters Sans Frontières 2010, 3) at the same time.
One of the first radio stations closed down by the CPA was Sawt Baghdad (Voice of Baghdad) after only one month from its launch (RSF July 2003). On June 12, 2003 Coalition forces closed down Sada al-Uma (The nation's echo) newspaper in Najaf stating that it incited violence against coalition troops by inviting the people of Najaf to join the Sunni resistance in Ramadi city in Anbar province (Rohde 2003; Barry 2003) .
Also, the CPA ordered the closure of Al-Mustaqila (independent) newspaper in July 2003 after publishing an article 'proclaiming the killing of spies who cooperate with the United States to be a religious duty ' (Freedom House 2004) . But probably the worst decision taken by the CPA was closing Muqtada Sadr's newspaper al-Hawza al-Natiqa al-Sharifa.
Sadr's hard line Shiite movement strongly opposes the occupation. On 28 March, 2003 US forces confiscated the weekly newspaper's last edition together with the editions of a quarterly journal called al-Mada. The newspaper was accused of fermenting violence against American forces in Iraq, so its office was closed for sixty days. Following the closure of the newspaper, an insurrection erupted in almost all Shiite areas in the country (Rosen 2004a; Rosen 2004b ). Price (2007) observes that the CPA saw the media regulations as a 'military necessity ' (2007, 16) which reflects the fear US officials had from what is known as 'irresponsible journalism'. However, the CPA's fast and sometimes violent reaction toward any anti-US media outlet and its inaction toward other channels that incited violence and hatred against fellow Iraqi sects, groups, and religions show that the US administration was only concerned about its own safety and the security of its soldiers.
Surely, this careless and one-sided policy encouraged many Iraqi media channels, that were newly established, to be more polarized and extreme in their criticism and attacks against other fellow Iraqis because of the unlimited freedom given to them. Before discussing the details of the US media intervention in Iraq, it is important first to discuss the media impact on audience since the theory is relevant to Iraq's media context.
Theoretical Framework:
According to the agenda-setting theory, people get to understand the world around them and the issues covered through the perspective of the media since 'citizens deal with a second-hand reality, a reality that is structured by journalists' report about these events and situations ' (McCombs 2004, 1) . In other words, the media sets its own agenda (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Entman, 1989) and shapes certain beliefs (Krosnick & Kinder, 1990) . If certain issues are continuously repeated in the media, they become more important for the public. 'The agenda of the news becomes, to a considerable degree, the agenda of the public' (McCombs 2004, 2) . However, when certain issues are related to the people's core beliefs like their religion and creed, the issues start to have much more importance and influence over the way people behave (McCombs 2004, 138) . In this case, the media can have a very effective role in driving the people toward certain actions. For example, during civil wars, the media is known to have assisted in justifying 'mass violence' through the 'constructions of ethnophobia' or sectarian animosity; the media is used to 'escalate hatred and spread fear against one another' and as a 'centerpiece of the struggle between factions' (Erni 2005) .
The other important concept that is relevant to this research is ideology. Thompson (1990) asserts that ideology is a 'meaning in the service of power' (7); hence, the official media is part and parcel of political system controlling the country. The media becomes a mere tool to convey the ideology of the ruling political party. Accordingly, the media messages that were sent were loaded with harmful effects. Hall (1985) suggests that journalists working in different media channels are influenced by their own ideology even if they have not noticed or have not acknowledged it as they are 'inscribed by an ideology to which they do not consciously commit themselves, and which, instead, "writes them"' (101). Further, van Dijk (1998) stressed that ideologies can distinguish between the different groups in a given society, and they mostly determine how 'groups and their members view a specific issue or domain of society' (65).
The new political reality drove Iraq to obvious divisions. 'Quotas are obligatory; power is rigidly contested on sectarian and ethnic lines. Deadlock often ensues, with each community seeing politics as winner-takes-all. It is resolved only when a kingmaker's pressure finds a last-minute solution' (Shadid 2010) . Indeed, the Iraqi politico-religious had in most cases conflicting agendas and ideologies that played a negative role in further dividing the different sects and races. Almost all of these parties have had different media channels such as terrestrial or satellite television stations, radio channels, newspapers, magazines, websites, forums, blogs …etc. Accordingly, the media became divided along ethno-sectarian lines, and it created a great deal of confusion, chaos, and risk for all the journalists involved (Al-Qaisi and Jabbar 2010). Many Iraqi journalists became polarized either toward their sect, race, or region in order to seek protection or win the favor of their party or community leaders (Al-Rawi 2010) . On the other hand, Iraqi audiences started to consume the media that fits into their religious, ethnic, or political backgrounds which is also the case in America where TV audience is heterogeneous that resides to their preferred political trend (Morris 2007) . In other words, the partisan media in Iraq assisted in forming and unifying the ideology of the different segments in the society because it was their main source of information. Before discussing how this phenomenon During Saddam Hussein's rule, the Iraqi media was completely state-controlled as it is mostly the case in today's Arab world (UNDP 2009, 65) . Social and moral values and norms were all dictated to the public via the mass media. Though media censorship was one of the strictest in the region, some Iraqi journalists were able to publicly voice their criticism against the government, but they would usually face a severe punishment mostly imprisonment and a possible consequent torture. Reporters Sans Frontières described Hussein as a 'predator of press freedom' who managed the Iraqi media with 'an iron fist and has given them the single mission of relaying his propaganda ' (2002, 3 & 1) .
Despite all the limitations faced by Iraqi journalists and the media shortcomings, the Iraqi media did not witness the sectarian rhetoric that is so prevalent today. If there was any breach, the punishment varied based on the case itself, but it ranged from imprisonment of less than seven years to payment of a fine. Saddam Hussein's government was very adamant and serious about applying the rules above.
These strict rules entailed that journalists should be very careful when they write. Terms like 'Shiites' or 'Sunnis' were never used in the media. Also, the surnames of Iraqi officers and officials were mostly not revealed so that their sect or race would not be known (Bengio 1985, 13 & 14) . In fact, Saddam Hussein was aware of the sensitivity which accompanies the issue of sectarianism especially that Iran waged a fierce propaganda campaign during the Iraq-Iran War (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) counter extreme religious propaganda coming from abroad. As for the Kurds, the Iraqi government stood against the Kurdish race chauvinism, fearing the instability and disunity that may be ensued in the country. However, there were many Kurdish language publications, and the language itself was taught in some high schools in Baghdad unlike the case in neighboring countries where Kurdish language was banned. In fact, Saddam Hussein's aim was to establish a secular political system that is the only guarantee to secure a unified Iraq and to avoid religious or ethnic rifts that would cost him lives, efforts, and money. However, when the US invasion occurred in 2003, Iraqis were amazed to openly read about and listen to the words 'Shiite' or 'Sunni' mentioned; this was the new media reality that they faced. Since the media scene is a direct reflection of the political reality in Iraq, it is important to discuss the political developments after the US invasion. (Barker 2008, 120) , George Mansour, Alaa Fa'ik, Ahmed Al-Rikabi, and Isam AlKhafaji. Indeed, the Iraqi media was designed as a tool used to strengthen the US control over the country and to increase the public acceptance of its actions despite the pretence that IMN was planned to be an independent media body. The document, for instance, mentions the need to have a '"hand-selected"' 'US-trained Iraqi media teams 
The US Army and Iraq's Media
When the US Army invaded Iraq, it started to study how to penetrate into the newly established Iraqi media in order to guarantee that 'friendly' channels cover its activities.
US PSYOP officers DeCarvalho, Kivett, and Lindsey mentioned that an Iraqi media section was formed by their department to monitor the media, send press releases, and establish good relations with more than a dozen Iraqi media outlets (2007, 91) . Following the 'White Paper' project, they revealed that the best way to address the Iraqi public was to make Iraqis themselves speak on behalf of the US government since 'putting an Iraqi face on the story; an Iraqi reporter talking to fellow Iraqis has a much greater effect on the psyche than if a coalition reporter told the story ' (2007, 92) . It is important to note here that the US Army supported Iraqi media channels that covered its activities in a favorable manner and vice versa, which is part of its communication strategy. However, it has certainly harmed other media outlets that sought to remain distant. In this regard, an Iraqi independent TV journalist called, Abdel-Hakim (pseudonym), revealed the difficulties faced by his colleagues, saying that 'U.S. forces often tell such journalists they are not allowed to cover certain events', but 'if they insist, they have been known to be arrested or killed'. If a journalist is killed, '"the U.S. military spokesman says they were killed by accident"'. On the other hand, 'journalists working for television stations directly supported by coalition forces have been given permission to cover the same events' (Allen 2006) . Furthermore, Colonel Thomas M. Cioppa (2009) However, the Pentagon did not regard these activities as illegal as they targeted a foreign audience. According to the US Army, the term 'merchandising' is introduced which allows a PSYOP's officer to give gifts to journalists and others in order to polish the image of the Army. 'The best way of disseminating a message might be to print it on a matchbox, a toy, a novelty, or a trinket. A soccer ball marked "Gift of the United States" and given to a schoolboy might get the message of American friendship across more effectively than any conventional medium' (US Army Field Manual 1994, 9-9). Despite the harsh criticism from different media organizations, US government media efforts continued and greatly expanded in 2008. With a budget of $300 million, the project was supposed to run for three years to 'produce undercover news stories, entertainment programmes and public service advertisements for Iraqi media in an effort to "engage and inspire" the local population to support United States policy'. The contractors involved in these 'media services' are: SOSi, Lincoln Group, MPRI and Leonie Industries which are supposed to plant '30-and 60-minute broadcast documentary and entertainment series' in different Iraqi TV channels (Young and Pincus 2008, A01) . Most importantly, the storyboards were classified in a pattern that resembles the 'White Paper' project; for example, each story 'had a target audience, "Iraq General" or "Shi'ia," with a dominant 'theme like "Anti-intimidation" or "Success and Legitimacy of the ISF" (Gerth 2005 ).
To sum up, the US government carried the banner of media freedom and democracy and hailed the new regime that it brought to Iraq, but it worked in the opposite direction serving and protecting its own interests. In this regard, al-Qazwini affirms that the US authorities followed 'their own agenda, paying lip service to the concept of a proper public broadcasting system, while doing what they feel is good for the Coalition, not for the Iraqi people' (2004).
The Establishment of IMN
As mentioned earlier, the CPA established the Iraqi Media Network (IMN) as was planned in the 'White Paper' project. However, very few Iraqis were involved in the planning process that went afterward mainly due to the deteriorating security condition.
As for the Iraqi Governing Council members who work from the fortified Green Zone, they were mostly busy with their 'own survival and succession' and lacked the motive and interest to discuss the future of Iraq's media (Price 2007, 15) .
Originally, IMN was supposed to replace the Ministry of Information in order to become a public service media outlet like the BBC and PBS. In April 10, 2003 IMN's radio aired its first programs and in May 13, Al-Iraqia TV channel started broadcasting with the help of 350 Iraqis; some of them came with the US forces (Dauenhauer and Lobe 2003) .
Indeed, IMN was manipulated and fully controlled from the beginning of its establishment by the CPA which used to dictate policies to be followed such as dropping 'the readings from the Koran' and the '"vox-pop" man-in-the-street interviews (usually critical of the US invasion)'. Censorship reached a level when Hiru Khan, the wife of the current Kurdish President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, was told to review the TV broadcast before airing it (Jayasekera 2003) . The UK government also provided technical support, programs, and documentaries to help build IMN. Amongst its activities was its insistence to air a one-hour daily program called 'Toward Freedom' despite the objection of some IMN media staff (North 2003) . Many IMN staff members felt disillusioned as a result of such overt interference. For instance, Don North worked for IMN for almost three months as a senior TV advisor and trainer. After leaving Iraq, he revealed how IMN became 'an irrelevant mouthpiece for Coalition Provisional Authority propaganda' due to its 'managed news and mediocre programs' (North 2003) . IMN original goal was to be 'an information conduit'; instead, it became 'just rubber-stamp flacking for the C.P.A.' (Opel 2003) In his speech in the US Congress in February 2005, North revealed that several US officials stressed that 'we were running a public diplomacy operation' via IMN which was given a 'laundry list of CPA activities to cover' (Margasak, 2005) . (Roug 2006) . Indeed, the CPA allowed IMN to function freely though it knew about its biased and subjective coverage simply because it served its interests by covering and praising its activities. In short, the CPA planned to have an IMN that is independent and free from any political group; unfortunately the plan was destined to fail from the beginning because it stayed on paper and was never put into real action.
The New Iraqi Media Scene
The US-led invasion and its aftermath brought with it new freedom of expressions and some other benefits for Iraqi journalists such as the interaction with international media organizations and western journalists and the salary scale improvement. However, censorship remained a fundamental issue since the majority of journalists still practice self-censorship. For example, it is 'unthinkable' to criticize political or religious leaders like Muqtada Sadr or Nouri al-Maliki (Kim and Hama-Saeed 2008, 588) To sum up, the US political design to shape Iraq as a democracy had catastrophic consequences on the political and social levels which will remain apparent for decades to come. The new ethno-sectarian Iraqi media, an extension of this new political reality, has played a major role in enhancing the division in the Iraqi society. In their book, Erasing Iraq (2010) Otterman, Hil, and Wilson call the change that occurred to the Iraqi society after the occupation due to forced displacement and targeted violence as a sociocide. This is, unfortunately, part of the US pragmatic policy that also entails a misreading of Iraq's history and society and miscalculation of the potential damage of sectarianism. Though today's sectarian violence in the country has dramatically decreased, and the Iraqi media rhetoric has slightly improved, there is still a physical and social rift, for the city of Baghdad and other strategic regions have become divided into Sunni and Shiite neighborhoods mostly separated by concrete walls. Socially, intermarriages between Sunnis and Shiites have become a rare event. Indeed, the wounds inflicted during the sectarian tension need a great deal of time to heal, but first Iraqi media outlets must address Iraqis as a whole and seek independence form their sponsors before a positive change occurs.
